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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
After being arrested on drug charges, thirty-four-year-old Michael Tappin filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence gathered by the police as a result of a traffic stop. The 
district court denied the motion to suppress. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Tappin 
then pleaded guilty to felony trafficking in heroin. Mr. Tappin's conditional plea reserved 
his right to appeal the district court's denial his motion to suppress. The district court 
imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with ten years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Tappin 
argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
An undercover narcotics detective with the Boise Police Department purchased 
half a gram of heroin for $60.00 in pre-recorded funds from Steven McDaniel. 
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.2-3.) Mr. McDaniel told the 
undercover detective that he was preparing to go to Seattle with a friend to purchase 
heroin that he was willing to sell upon his return. (PSI, p.3.) He offered to sell the 
undercover detective ten grams of heroin for $700.00. (PSI, p.3; R., p.75.) 
A few days later, Mr. McDaniel told the undercover detective he was back in 
Boise, and the two agreed to meet at the Shell station on Federal Way in Boise. (PSI, 
p.3; R., pp.75-76.) Once Mr. McDaniel arrived at the Shell station, he told the 
undercover detective that he would have to delay the sale because he did not have a 
digital scale to measure the purchase. (R., p.76.) Mr. McDaniel told the undercover 
detective he had just returned from a trip to Seattle to purchase the heroin, and that his 
friend "Mikey" had gone with him. (PSI, p.3.) After the undercover detective drove 
Mr. McDaniel to a Fred Meyer in search of a digital scale, Mr. McDaniel stated that he 
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would have to get a digital scale from Mikey. (R., p.76.) The undercover detective 
drove Mr. McDaniel to the vicinity of Malad and Virginia Streets, where Mr. McDaniel got 
out of the car to walk to Mikey's house because Mikey did not want people to know 
where he lived. (R., p.76.) The undercover detective radioed a Boise Police 
Department surveillance team that Mr. McDaniel was walking north, and the 
surveillance team saw Mr. McDaniel returning from one of two houses on Virginia 
Street. (R., p.76.) While the surveillance team saw Mr. McDaniel walking from the yard 
area of one of the two houses, they did not actually see him exit one of the houses and 
could not identify the specific address he came from. (Tr., p.65, Ls.5-19.) 
Mr. McDaniel got back to the undercover detective's car, and the two drove to the 
same Shell station to complete the sale. (R., p.76.) Back at the Shell station, 
Mr. McDaniel weighed out ten grams of heroin and gave it to the undercover detective, 
who saw an additional large piece of heroin in Mr. McDaniel's backpack. (PSI, p.3.) 
Mr. McDaniel left on foot, and was then taken into custody by Boise police officers. 
(PSI, p.3; R., p.76.) 
Meanwhile, the surveillance team continued to watch the two houses on Virginia 
Street. (R., p.76.) A short time later, a gray vehicle arrived in the area. (PSI, p.3.) 
Officers saw the vehicle stop for a few minutes, make an illegal U-turn, then stop while 
pointing the other way, and then move a short distance to an area near the intersection. 
(R., p.76; Tr., p.117, Ls.7-8.) According to Detective Bruner, one of the officers on the 
surveillance team, the vehicle pulled over multiple times without signaling. (Tr., p.116, 
L.23 - p.117, L.14.) Mr. Tappin then exited the residence at 2423 Virginia Street (one 
of the two houses) and got into the passenger seat of the vehicle. (PSI, p.3.) 
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The officers then made a traffic stop on the vehicle. (PSI, p.3; R., pp.76-77.) 
Detective Bruner testified that when the officers made the stop, the vehicle was pulling 
away from the curb without signaling. (Tr., p.117, Ls.14-18.) As the stop began, 
Mr. Tappin appeared to reach into his waistband area and then move his hands out of 
sight. (PSI, p.32, R., p.77.) Detectives identified the driver of the vehicle as James 
Dougal. (PSI, p.3.) Both Mr. Dougal and Mr. Tappin were removed from the vehicle 
and asked if they had weapons or contraband. (PSI, p.3; R., p.77.) Mr. Tappin 
consented to a pat down search. (R., p.77.) The officers found a bag containing ten 
grams of a substance, later confirmed to be heroin, in Mr Tappin's pocket. (PSI, p.3; 
R., p.77.) Mr. Tappin and Mr. Dougal were then taken into custody. (PSI, p.3.) Later, 
Mr. Tappin's house at 2423 Virginia was searched pursuant to a search warrant. 
(R., p.77.) 
Mr. Tappin was charged with conspiracy to traffic in heroin, felony, in violation of 
Idaho Code §§ 37-2732B(a)(6)(C), 18-701, 37-2732(b) and 19-304; trafficking in heroin, 
felony, in violation of I.C. §§ 37-2732B(a)(6) and 18-204; and possession of drug 
paraphernalia, misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 37-2734A. (R., pp.30-32.) 
Mr. Tappin initially entered a plea of not guilty to the charges. (R., p.43.) 
Mr. Tappin subsequently filed a motion to suppress the evidence gathered by the 
police as a result of the traffic stop, or in the alternative, to dismiss the charges against 
him. (R., pp.56-57.) His Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Suppress argued 
that the detectives stopped Mr. Dougal and Mr. Tappin without a warrant or any 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. (R., pp.58-64.) 
Evidence was presented and argument was heard on the motion to suppress. 
(R., p.75.) Later, the district court entered an order denying the motion to suppress. 
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(R., pp.75-78.) The district court held that "[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances, 
the stop was justified." (R., p.78.) "[T]he driver of the car made several traffic 
violations. . . . [A] traffic stop is justified if there are specific, articulable facts that the 
vehicle is either being driven contrary to traffic laws or that other criminal activity is 
afoot." (R., p.78.) The district court concluded that "[o]nce the stop occurred, nothing 
precluded the officer from asking [Mr.] Tappin for his consent to a search." (R., p.78.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Tappin subsequently agreed to plead guilty to 
the felony trafficking in heroin charge. (R., p.79; Tr., p.138, Ls.7-8, 18-20.) In his 
conditional plea, Mr. Tappin reserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of the 
motion to suppress. (R., p. Tr., 138, Ls.10-13.) The State agreed to dismiss the 
felony conspiracy to traffic in heroin and the misdemeanor possession of drug 
paraphernalia charges. (Tr., p.138, Ls.9-10, p.139, Ls.7-9.) The State would also 
recommend the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years fixed. (Tr., p.138, Ls.14-
16.) Pursuant to the plea agreement, each side was free to argue the indeterminate 
portion of the sentence. (Tr., p.138, L.25 - p.139, L.1.) The district court accepted 
Mr. Tappin's guilty plea. (R., p.79; Tr., p.152, Ls.6-12.) 
The district court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with ten years 
fixed. 1 (R., pp.89-90.) Both the State and Mr. Tappin's counsel had recommended that 
the district court impose a unified sentence of fifteen years, with ten years fixed. 
(Tr., p.157, L.25-p.158, L.5, p.158, Ls. 12-15.) 
Mr. Tappin filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.94-97.) 
1 Mr. McDaniel was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to ten years fixed. 
(PSI, p.4.) Mr. Dougal was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to five years 
fixed, to run concurrently with his conviction for felony forgery in a separate case. (PSI, 
p.3.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Tappin's motion to suppress, because the 
officers did not have reasonable suspicion to lawfully expand the traffic stop for 
investigation into drug activity, and thus his consent to a search was ineffective? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Tappin's Motion To Suppress, Because 
The Officers Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Lawfully Expand The Traffic Stop 
For Investigation Into Drug Activity, And Thus His Consent To A Search Was Ineffective 
Mr. Tappin asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to 
suppress. The officers did not have the requisite reasonable suspicion to lawfully 
expand the traffic stop for investigation into drug activity. Mr. Tappin's consent to a 
search was therefore ineffective. 
The standard of review of an order denying a motion to suppress is bifurcated. 
"When reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress, [an appellate court) 
defers to the findings of fact of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous." 
State v. OuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 552-53 (1998). "Additionally, any implicit findings of the 
trial court supported by substantial evidence should be given due deference." Id. at 
553. However, an appellate court "exercises free review over whether constitutional 
requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found." Id. 
"A traffic stop is subject to the Fourth Amendment restraint against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983 (Ct. App. 2003). A 
routine traffic stop, typically of limited scope and duration, is analyzed under the 
principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), because it is more analogous to 
an investigative detention than a custodial arrest. Id. "Under Terry, an investigative 
detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify 
suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal 
activity." Id. Under this standard, the "totality of the circumstances then known to the 
officer ... must show a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular 
person stopped of criminal activity." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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"To meet the constitutional standard of reasonableness, an investigative 
detention must not only be justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception, but also 
must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the 
first place." Id. However, 
[a]ny routine traffic stop might turn up suspicious circumstances which 
could justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the stop. The 
officer's observations, general inquiries, and events succeeding the stop 
may-and often do-give rise to legitimate reasons for particularized lines 
of inquiry and further investigation by an officer. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, "the length and scope of the stop may be 
lawfully expanded if the detaining officer can point to specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
In this case, the district court concluded that the traffic stop was justified 
because the driver of the car made several traffic violations, and once the stop was 
made, nothing precluded the officers from asking Mr. Tappin for consent to a search. 
(R., p.78.) Mr. Tappin concedes that the traffic stop of the vehicle, for failure to signal 
and for other traffic violations, was valid at its inception. See I.C. § 49-808(1); State v. 
Pressley, 131 Idaho 277, 279 (Ct. App. 1998). A traffic violation, as an unlawful activity, 
in itself justifies a traffic stop. DuVa/t, 131 Idaho at 553. Thus, this appeal concerns 
whether the traffic stop remained reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 
justified the stop in the first place. Mr. Tappin asserts that the officers did not have the 
requisite reasonable suspicion to lawfully expand the traffic stop for investigation into 
drug activity. Mr. Tappin also asserts that because the officers unlawfully expanded the 
traffic stop, he was being subjected to an illegal detention at the time that he was asked 
for his consent to a search, and his consent was therefore ineffective. 
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A. Under The Totality Of The Circumstances, The Officers Did Not Have The 
Requisite Reasonable Suspicion To Lawfully Expand The Traffic Stop For 
Investigation Into Drug Activity 
Mr. Tappin asserts that, under the totality of the circumstances in this case, the 
officers did not have the requisite reasonable suspicion to lawfully expand the traffic 
stop for investigation into drug activity. 
Immediately after the traffic stop began, Detective Bruner told Mr. Tappin to 
place his hands on top of his head. (Tr., p.78, Ls.16-19). Officer McCarthy then asked 
if Mr. Tappin was in possession of any weapons or contraband, and asked for 
permission to search Mr. Tappin's person. (Tr., p.79, Ls.21-25.) Detective Bruner then 
asked Mr. Tappin what his address was. (Tr., p.78, L.24 p.79, L.2, p.81, L.21 - p.82, 
L.2.) Both Officer McCarthy's questions and Detective Bruner's question about 
Mr. Tappin's address happened within a minute or two of the initial stop. (Tr., p.81, L.15 
- p.82, L.2.) 
Mr. Tappin submits that these questions expanded the length and scope of the 
traffic stop. After conducting the traffic stop, the officers immediately launched into their 
questions without any effort to further pursue the initial purpose of the traffic stop, 
namely the issuance of a citation for failure to signal and other traffic violations. See 
State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 564 (Ct. App. 2005). In fact, Detective Bruner did not 
mention the failure to signal in his police report, and Mr. Dougal was never cited for a 
traffic violation. (Tr., p.117, Ls.19-24, p.119, Ls.5-12.) 
Although the questioning in this case only took a minute or two, it extended the 
duration of the traffic stop beyond what was necessary to address the traffic violations. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals, as explored in Aguirre, 141 Idaho at 563-64, has decided 
several cases dealing with this issue. In Aguirre itself, the court concluded that the use 
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of a drug dog, without reasonable suspicion of a drug-related offense, impermissibly 
extended the duration of a traffic stop. Aguirre, 141 Idaho at 564. The officers in 
Aguirre did not concurrently resolve the traffic violation and investigate drug activity. Id. 
Rather, "the collective effort of the police was uniformly directed at a drug investigation 
completely unrelated to the traffic stop. The purpose that justified the stop---the 
issuance of a traffic citation---was immediately abandoned." Id. The defendant in 
Aguirre received a traffic citation only after he had been arrested on different charges. 
Id. 
Similarly, in another case the court held that it was unlawful for an officer to 
question a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer fulfilled the 
purpose of the traffic stop by issuing a written warning to the driver. State v. Gutierrez. 
137 Idaho 647, 651-53 (Ct App. 2002). The questioning, even though it only extended 
the duration of the stop by sixty to ninety seconds, was "an unwarranted intrusion upon 
the vehicle occupants' privacy and liberty." Id. at 652. 
In contrast, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that an officer's request to search a 
car was permissible where the request was made right after the officer completed a 
traffic citation, and the request lengthened the process only by a second or two. 
State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 852-53 (Ct App. 2000). Additionally, in another case the 
court decided it was lawful for one officer to question a vehicle's driver about drugs and 
weapons and run a drug dog around the car, while another officer checked the driver's 
status with dispatch and completed a traffic citation. State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 
362-63 (Ct App. 2000). In Silva and Parkinson, "the questioning and use of a drug dog 
did not extend the duration of the stop beyond that which was necessary to address the 
traffic violation." Aguirre, 141 Idaho at 563. 
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Here, the officers' questioning extended the duration of the traffic stop beyond 
that which was necessary to address the traffic violations. The circumstances of this 
case are similar to those in Aguirre and Gutierrez. Like the officers in Aguirre, 141 
Idaho at 564, the officers in this case uniformly directed their efforts at a drug 
investigation, without attempting to resolve the traffic violations. Thus, just as the use of 
a drug dog extended the duration of the traffic stop in Aguirre, 141 Idaho at 564, the 
questioning extended the duration of the traffic stop in this case. The duration of the 
questioning here-one to two minutes-is similar to the duration of the impermissible 
questioning (sixty to ninety seconds) in Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 
This case is readily distinguishable from Silva and Parkinson because, in those 
cases, the officers had completed or were in the process of completing a traffic 
citation-the initial purpose of the traffic stop-when the officers requested a search. 
Silva, 134 Idaho at 853, Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 363. In this case, the officers never 
initiated, much less completed, a traffic citation. Further, the questioning in Silva only 
took a few seconds, 134 Idaho at 853, as opposed to one or two minutes in this case. 
Mr. Tappin therefore submits that the officers' questioning extended the duration of the 
traffic stop beyond that which was necessary to address the traffic violations. 
Thus, to expand the length and scope of the traffic stop with their line of 
questioning on drug activity, the officers in this case would have needed reasonable 
suspicion that Mr. Tappin was involved in a drug-related offense. See Aguirre, 141 
Idaho at 564. However, the totality of the circumstances does not show that the officers 
had, at the time, "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts, [would] reasonably warrant" expanding the length and 
scope of the traffic stop. See Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983. 
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When the officers began questioning Mr. Tappin, they possessed the following 
information: (1) Mr. McDaniel had traveled with "Mikey" to Seattle to purchase heroin, 
(2) Mr. McDaniel had walked to Mikey's house from the vicinity of Malad and Virginia 
Streets to pick up a digital scale, (3) Mr. McDaniel had been seen walking from the yard 
area of one of two houses on Virginia Street, (4) Mr. Dougal had driven his vehicle, 
committed several traffic violations, and parked at several locations in the area, 
(5) Mr. Tappin had left 2423 Virginia (one of the two houses) and got into Mr. Dougal's 
vehicle, and (6) Mr. Tappin had been seen reaching into his waistband area and then 
moving his hands out of sight. (Supra, pp:1-3.) 
Mr. Tappin submits that this information is insufficient to establish reasonable 
suspicion that he was involved in a drug-related offense. Because the surveillance 
team never actually saw which one of the two houses Mr. McDaniel had exited and 
could not identify which address he had come from, (Tr., p.65, Ls.5-19), the officers did 
not have any specific and articulable facts connecting Mr. McDaniel and his drug activity 
to Mr. Tappin. Cf. Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 985 (concluding that officers' personal 
knowledge of drug activity committed in a defendant's house, informants' tips that the 
defendant was dealing drugs, the defendant's association with known drug offenders, 
officers' knowledge that the defendant had left a house associated with drug activity, 
and the defendant's appearance with bloodshot, glassy eyes apparently not caused by 
alcohol consumption, were sufficient to create reasonable suspicion of illegal drug 
activity). Unlike the officers in Sheldon, the officers here had no information that 
Mr. Tappin was dealing drugs or living in a house where drug activity had been 
committed. Further, the officers had no information showing that Mr. Tappin had even 
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exited the same house Mr. McDaniel had come from. There was also no testimony or 
other evidence that Mr. Tappin's appearance indicated any drug activity. 
"[R)easonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion." State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). At best, the officers here had a mere hunch that Mr. Tappin 
was involved in drug activity. Thus, the above information is insufficient to create 
reasonable suspicion to justify the officers' expansion of the traffic stop. Mr. Tappin 
therefore asserts that, under the totality of the circumstances in this case, the officers 
did not have the requisite reasonable suspicion to lawfully expand the traffic stop for 
investigation into drug activity. 
B. Because Mr. Tappin Was Being Subjected To An Illegal Detention, His Consent 
To A Search Was Ineffective 
Mr. Tappin asserts that he was being subjected to an illegal detention when he 
was asked for his consent to a search, and his consent was therefore ineffective. "A 
consent to search given during an illegal detention is tainted by the illegality and is 
therefore ineffective." Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 652. An illegal detention occurs where 
an individual is detained "even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for 
doing so," such as where officers have unlawfully extended a traffic stop. Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Here, Officer McCarthy asked for permission to search Mr. Tappin's person, and 
Mr. Tappin granted his consent. (Tr., p.79, L.24 - p.80, L.2.) While Mr. Tappin 
consented to a search of his person, by the time he consented the officers had 
unlawfully expanded the traffic stop and he was therefore being subjected to an illegal 
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detention. See Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 652. Thus, Mr. Tappin's consent to a search 
was ineffective. 
The officers in this case did not have the requisite reasonable suspicion to 
lawfully expand the traffic stop for investigation into drug activity. Mr. Tappin was being 
subjected to an illegal detention when he was asked to consent to a search, and his 
consent was therefore ineffective. Thus, the district court erred when it denied 
Mr. Tappin's motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Tappin respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of 
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion suppress. 
DATED this 19th day of February, 2013. 
BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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